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In the ongoing effort to staunch the Euro crisis, last Friday saw the signing of a
stringent new fiscal compact to limit budget deficits and debt, by 25 EU member
states. The European Court of Justice has taken on a new role to enforce these
provisions by enacting severe penalties on non-compliant countries. Damian
Chalmers argues that the Court’s record has been very little scrutinized. In a
second part of his case tomorrow, he argues that ECJ is too institutionally
enmeshed with European Union policy-making in general. It cannot now serve its
original purpose, and we should examine what alternative options exist.
Until now the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been the institutional expression of Europe’s
political morality. It has recently acquired a new role under the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance, signed last Friday by twenty five member states. Now the ECJ is to become an active
agent of executive government through enforcing the ‘fiscal compact’ section of the Treaty – under
which member states commit themselves to a balanced budget. The new requirements entail that
states with a total debt exceeding over 60 per cent of their GDP must run a structural deficit of no
greater than 0.5 per cent of GDP. (Member states with a lower debt/GDP ratio can run up only
somewhat less restrictive deficits, of up to 1 per cent of GDP).
It is difficult to over-dramatise the consequences of the new compact for economic policy-making. In
the noughties, when growth was good and capital cheap, the Euro area states ran a structural deficit
on average four and a half times greater than the 0.5 per cent level. Since the financial crisis began
in 2008, national debt repayments have increased, access to capital via bond markets has become
more expensive, and the majority of EU States are now under legal obligations to reduce their debt
to 60 per cent of GDP. On average this will mean Euro area states reducing their total debt by just
under one third. Europe’s citizens will be paying a lot more taxes for a lot less welfare.
It might be thought that if national politicians decide to entrench a certain economic policy making
model, it is ultimately their prerogative. They are accountable for that choice in both domestic and
Union elections. Electorates can kick them out, if they wish, and bring in politicians who will change
the policies.  However, whilst it will still be possible to give the politicians a good kicking, it will only
be that: an exercise in political sadism which will probably be enjoyable, certainly fetishistic, but
ultimately only empty. For this is where the Court of Justice comes in. It is there to ensure that the
policies cannot be changed whilst the Union lasts in the current format.
Policing the constitutional retrenchment of public finances is an unusual role for a court. However, in
the ECJ’s case it is not a one-off role, and the new task is symptomatic of the Court moving
increasingly to centre stage in fiscal and welfare policy-making within the European Union.
The new reforms widen the range of state behaviors for which the Court may levy eye-watering fines
on member states. These include
running a budget deficit of more than 3 per cent of GDP;
failing to bring total government debt down to the 60 per cent threshold sufficiently quickly;
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running ‘excessive macro-economic imbalances’;
significantly deviating from the medium-term budgetary objectives agreed with the other
member states; and
providing inaccurate statistical information to the EU institutions (such as the European
Commission of Eurostat).
These new, binding provisions are to be introduced by each of the 25 signatory member states into
their national law within one year of the Treaty coming into force, and the new law should be
permanent and preferably constitutional. If states fail to take these steps the European Commission
is required to take them before the Court of Justice, who can issue a judgment requiring the State to
take the necessary measures. If the member state in question does not comply with the ECJ verdict,
they can then be brought back before the Court to be fined up to 0.1per cent of GDP. Although not
stated explicitly in the Treaty, it looks as if this fining process could be endlessly repeated until the
country does comply. (This is the normal way in which the ECJ operates to secure compliance).
Thus last week’s new compact means that changes that will ultimately transform the social contract
between states and their citizens are to be railroaded through by the Commission officials and the
Court of Justice judges ensuring that there is not the slightest expression of democratic deviation.
Once these changes have been instituted, a double bind is then introduced. Unilateral constitutional
amendment during the life of this Treaty is prevented by its terms – so a country cannot singly alter
its commitment. Amendment at a pan-Union level will prove difficult, because it will require that all
the States concerned obtain the super-majorities domestically necessary to amend their
constitutions. Suppose that one state in the Euro zone fails in its own legislature to achieve this
threshold for the pan-Union change – then there is little reason for it to allow other states to depart
from the current Treaty. Otherwise, the state draws the ‘dummy’ card of continuing to accept the full
costs of fiscal rectitude while its partners enjoy more relaxed rules. Through currency and possible
fiscal transfers, the dummy state would then become subject to the fiscal irresponsibilities of those
who have abandoned the previous rules.
The Court’s record as a judicial institution
What can we say about the European Court of
Justice, the institution that will now be sitting at the
centre of this unprecedented transnational
experiment? Is the fact that ECJ has acquired this
dramatic new role indicative of its high institutional
standing and tremendous existing success? Or has
ECJ acquired additional responsibilities chiefly
because (alone amongst EU institutions) it has so
far escaped the level of critical scrutiny and
exposure to public gaze to which other parts of the
EU have been subjected? In the rest of this blog,
and in my follow-on blog tomorrow, I want to argue
the latter case strongly. I suggest that scrutiny of the
ECJ needs to be greatly increased, and
specifically we should be concerned with how to
reduce its role rather than how to augment it. To
start with here I briefly review the Court’s record.
In its sixty year history (dating back to the very earliest days of the European Economic Community,
the EEC, predecessor of the EU) the European Court of Justice has been subject to institutional
review only twice. In both cases, these reviews could not be said to be fully independent, insofar as
they were done by former Presidents of the Court itself. The first review was the Due Report in 2000
for the Treaty of Nice, which proposed modest reforms to the Court of Justice. These Due report
suggestions were ignored in the Court’s own submission to the Inter-Governmental Conference and
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all of them were rejected at the Treaty of Nice.
The second occasion when ECJ was reviewed was the Discussion Circle led by Gil Rodriguez
Iglesias at the Future of Europe Convention in 2003. The choice made to have a Discussion Circle
(rather than the more ambitious Working Party process used with other significant Treaty matters)
foreclosed the range of debate that might have taken place at the Convention.
The Court itself is composed of 27 judges, one from each member state. Only ten of the current
judges (that’s 37 per cent) have served in a domestic appellate court or above within their member
state. To their credit, eight of the experienced ten come from the A-12 countries (the 12 newest
member states who joined since 2004). The other two experienced judges come from two of the pre
2004 (or EU-15) states, the United Kingdom and France.
Because the Court decides almost all
matters that come before it in ‘Chambers’,
each of which has three or five judges, it is
worth noting that the dispersion of the
experienced judges between Chambers
varies greatly. There are two Chambers, the
First and Fifth, where only one of the judges
currently sitting has domestic appellate
experience. So in these Chambers, cases
are essentially being decided by people
with no significant prior experience of
judging before they joined the ECJ.
Nor is the separation of powers between the Court and other arms of government so clear. In
November 2011 it was widely reported that the principal alternative to Lucas Papademos for the
post of Greek Prime Minister was the current President of the Court, VassilisSkouris.
In terms of its outputs, in the last year the Court has
made it impossible for most forms of stem cell research to take place
prevented general restrictions being imposed on secretive processing of  data without the
subject’s consent.
By contrast, the Court has expressly indicated that it is perfectly acceptable
for individuals to have their fundamental rights violated within EU member states;
for the EU to breach customary international law; and
for individuals to be stopped moving from State to State because they have not paid their
taxes.
The ECJ’s dialogue with constitutional courts is much vaunted in the literature about it, but again in
the last two years its central interventions have been:
to refuse to take submissions from one country’s constitutional court and
to deny the French Constitutional Council its traditional role of assessing whether French laws
violate the French Constitution, if such an assessment in any way touches upon EU law.
It might be argued that all the Court needs to become a better judicial institution is simply a change
of personnel. However, it is not just the style of the Court of Justice’s interventions which is
problematic – it is also their scale. In February 2012, a relatively uncontroversial month by ECJ
standards, the Court gave significant judgments
on VAT law;
gambling law;
environmental law;
the ownership of cinematographic works, and
the duties of Internet Service Providers to filter information.
This all begs the question as to whether the Court brings sufficient benefits to be worth all this, a
subject continued in my next blog tomorrow.
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